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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taxation of the income of a short-term trust have been either solved
or simplified by the so-called "Clifford Trust" provisions of the
1954 Code,37 and if the grantor will carefully comply with their
requirements, he will be largely assured that the trust income will
not be taxed to him.
Tax consequences of a gift and leaseback are sufficiently pre-
dictable to permit use of the device for income-splitting among
family members. However, taxpayers should be wary in using the
device with a short-term trust so long as the possibility exists that
a reversionary interest held by the grantor in the trust corpus will
be found to be a prohibited equity under section 162(a) (3).
Until this issue is settled favorably, it would appear wise to make
a gift of the entire fee to the trust, to sell the reversionary interest,
or to give the remainder interest to another beneficiary who is not
so related to the taxpayer as to raise an issue of his possible con-
tinued control over the property.
THOMAS J. BOLCH
Taxation-Strike Benefits as Income
The Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income "the
value of property acquired by gift."' Although similar language
was contained in the first income tax statute2 following enactment
of the sixteenth amendment and in all subsequent revenue acts,3
"' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78. The name "Clifford" comes from
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the landmark case requiring
the settlor to pay tax on the income of a short-term trust where he retained
substantial elements of control over the trust corpus and income. This case
caused a great amount of uncertainty and resulted in the promulgation by
the Treasury of the Clifford Regulations, which set up a series of clear
tests defining the situations in which the income of a trust would be taxable
to the grantor. These regulations were put into the Code itself in 1954.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
' Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167, provided that gross
income shall not include "the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent."
' Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 4, 39 Stat. 758; War Revenue Act of
1917, ch. 63, § 1200, 40 Stat. 329; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b) (3),
40 Stat. 1065; Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b) (3), 42 Stat. 238;
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 213(b) (3), 43 Stat. 268; Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 213(b) (3), 44 Stat. 24; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §
22(b)(3), 45 Stat. 798; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 22(b)(3), 48
Stat. 687; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 22(b) (3), 49 Stat. 1657;
Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 22(b) (3), 52 Stat. 458; INT. REv. CODE OF
1939, § 22(b)(3), as amended, ch. 619, § 111(a) (3), 56 Stat. 809 (1942)(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a)).
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Congress has never defined "gift"4 for income tax purposes, nor has
the Commissioner attempted its definition in his regulations." Be-
cause of this the definition of "gift" has necessarily been left to
the courts to shape on an ad hoc basis.
The intention of the donor6 is the most critical factor in de-
termining whether a particular transfer is a gift. This intention,
however, is to be distinguished from the personal property law con-
cept of "donative intent"' because the income tax statute uses the
term "gift" in a more colloquial sense' than did the common law.
A gift in the statutory sense must derive from a "detached and
disinterested generosity,"9 arising "out of affection, respect, admira-
tion, charity or like impulses."' ° However, the donor's character-
ization of his action is not conclusive because "there must be an
objective inquiry as to whether what is called a gift amounts to it
in reality."'1 The mere absence of a moral or legal obligation to
make the transfer does not necessarily create a gift.' 2 But, if the
transfer proceeds primarily from "the constraining force of any
moral or legal duty,"'" or from the incentive of anticipated bene-
fits,' 4 or where payment is in return for services rendered, even
though the donor receives no economic benefit,'5 it is not a gift.
Because the law had become "unclear and uncertain ' 16 and be-
cause of the Treasury's insistence that it had found a "new" test
that would "almost automatically dispose of the great bulk of the
'gift' cases,"' 17 the United States Supreme Court in 1959 granted
certiorari in two cases that were to become the leading cases in
the field: Commissioner v. Duberstein8 and Stanton v. United
'For a proposed solution to the gift vs. income problem, which was not
adopted, see 106 CONG. REc. 12449 (1960).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1 (1965).
'Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937).
See Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68 (1873).
s Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
'Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
' Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
"Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 40 (1937).
12 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 730 (1929).
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
"Ibid.
'
5 Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
18 Brief for Respondent, p. 5, Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278
(1960).
"Id. at 29.18363 U.S. 278 (1960). In Duberstein the taxpayer had from time to
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States." The Treasury's "new" test that "gifts should be defined as
transfers of property made for personal as distinguished from busi-
ness reasons" 20 was rejected by the Court, as was the Treasury's sug-
gestion that "motive" rather than "intention" govern the taxability
of a particular transfer.2 ' In rejecting the Treasury's invitation to fix
a "standard to be applied by the lower courts and the Tax Court,"22
the Supreme Court stated that "the governing principles are neces-
sarily general ... [and] the problem is one which, under the present
statutory framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive
time furnished the president of Mohawk Metal Corp. with the names of
potential customers for Mohawk's products. In appreciation, and over his
protest that he was owed nothing, taxpayer received a Cadillac automobile.
Taxpayer did not include the value of the automobile in his gross income
for 1951, deeming it a gift. The Commissioner asserted a deficiency for
the value of the car that was sustained by the Tax Court, which found the
automobile was remuneration for services rendered by taxpayer. Mose
Duberstein, 1958 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 13 (1958). The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Duberstein v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 28
(6th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. 363
U.S. at 293.
1" 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Stanton and Duberstein. were argued together
and consolidated into one opinion. In Stanton taxpayer had been employed
for ten years by Trinity Church as comptroller of the church corporation
and as president of a "holy" owned subsidiary that the church had estab-
lished to manage its real estate holdings. In 1942 taxpayer resigned both
positions to go into business for himself. In appreciation for his services,
the board of directors of the subsidiary, which included the vicar and
vestry of the church, voted taxpayer a $20,000 "gratuity." Taxpayer failed
to include the "gratuity" in his gross income, and the Commissioner asserted
a deficiency. In taxpayer's suit for recovery, the district court found that
the payment was a "gift." Stanton v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 803
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd, 286 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959), rema duing for addi-
tional finding of fact, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
'
0 Id. at 284 n.6.
"1 The Treasury reasoned that the only factual distinction that could be
made among the various kinds of voluntary payments was the difference in
"motive," or reasons why they were made. Brief for Respondent, p. 23,
Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Motive was defined as
the inducing cause of the payments or transfer. The Treasury argued that
for tax purposes the distinction should be made between those transactions
motivated by personal and those motivated by business reasons. Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 13-15, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960);
Brief for Respondent, pp. 29-33, Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278
(1960). A business reason was to be any reason that established a "proxi-
mate ...causal relationship between the payment and the conduct of the
business, the production of income, or the performances of services." Brief
for Respondent, p. 29, Stanton v. United States, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
Any reason that was not a business reason would be a personal one. If
such a transfer was sufficiently related to the business in such a way as to
be an allowable deduction for tax purposes, then it could not qualify as a
gift. Id. at 30.
" Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960).
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statement . *.". . The Court reasoned that the problem "remains
basically one of fact, for determination on a case-by-case basis."'24 It
concluded that the decision in each case must be determined by
the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each
case .. . . [P]rimary weight in this area must be given to the
conclusions of the trier of fact.2 5
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reproached
the Court for setting "fact-finding bodies to sail on an illimitable
ocean of individual beliefs and experiences. '26
It was upon this background of uncertainty that the Supreme
Court for the first time considered in United States v. Kaiser2 7 the
income tax consequences of union strike benefits. The taxpayer in
Kaiser was an employee of the Kohler Company of Wisconsin. The
bargaining representative at Kohler, a local of the United Auto-
mobile Workers, called a strike, and taxpayer went out on strike
although he was not a member of the union. His job was his sole
source of income, and when he found himself in need of financial
assistance, he applied to the union for help. After he had been
questioned about his financial resources and dependents, the union
agreed to pay his rent and give him a food voucher redeemable in
kind at the local grocery store. To receive these strike benefits
taxpayer did not have to join the union, nor did he have to perform
any picketing duties. Taxpayer failed to include the amount of the
strike benefits in his gross income. In the district court2 s the trial
judge submitted to the jury the simple interrogatory of whether
the strike assistance was a gift. The jury answered that it was,
but the court held as a matter of law that the benefit payments were
income. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.29
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that
"on the basis of our opinion in the Duberstein Case. . . the jury in
this case, as finder of the facts, acted within its competence in
concluding that the assistance rendered here was a gift."3 0 The
23 Ibid.
2 1 Id. at 290.2 Id. at 289.
Id. at 297 (concurring opinion).
2,363 U.S. 299 (1960).
2 Kaiser v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis. 1958).2 Kaiser v. United States, 262 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958).
30363 U.S. at 303.
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court listed several factors from which the jury could have inferred
that the assistance did not proceed from a "constraint of moral or
legal obligation, of a nature that would preclude it from being a
gift."'" These factors are (1) the form and amount of the assis-
tance and the conditions of personal need, (2) the lack of other
sources of income, compensation, or public assistance, (3) the de-
pendency status, and (4) that, while the assistance was furnished
only to strikers, it was not conditioned upon performing any strike
duties.1
2
Since Kaiser, four lower-court cases, two in the federal district
court and two in the tax court, have held that union strike benefits
were not gifts but were taxable income to the taxpayers. The first
of these decisions was Godwin v. United States.3 3 Godwin dealt
with payments made by the Air Line Pilots' Association to a strik-
ing pilot. In Godwin the judge did not let the case go to the jury
but held as a matter of law that the strike benefit payments were
not gifts. The court listed several factors which it thought dis-
tinguished the case from Kaiser. First, the union did not consider
the personal financial situation of the individual pilots or the avail-
ability of help from outside sources, such as unemployment insur-
ance, in determining how much each pilot would be paid, but paid
each pilot sixty per cent of his salary. Second, while the amount
of the payments in Kaiser were very small, were not paid in cash
and were not paid directly to the taxpayer, here the payments to
the taxpayer amounted to approximately 700 dollars a month and
were paid in cash directly to the striking taxpayer. Third, the tax-
payer in Godwin was a member of the union and participated direct-
ly in the strike. Last, the union voted to pay the pilots strike
benefits before they actually went out on strike. The court thought
that this would give the pilots a "legally enforceable right to receive
[the] benefits."' 34 In keeping the case from the jury, the court
relied on the "motive" of the union in making the payments, reason-
ing that whether a benefit payment was a gift or income depended
upon whether it flowed from charitable motives exclusively. In
other words, in order to get this case to the jury, the Court
would have to determine that there is some evidence from which
01 Id. at 304.
0" Ibid.
" 65-1 U.S. TAx. CAs. 9121 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
8" Id. at 94, 576.
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a jury could find that the only motive for these payments was
charitable .... 35
The second case after Kaiser was that of John N. Hagar,s
where the taxpayer was employed as a copy editor for a St. Louis
newspaper. When the union of which taxpayer was a member, a
local of the American Newspaper Guild, called a strike against the
newspaper, taxpayer actively participated in the strike and received
strike benefit payments. In reaching its decision the Tax Court
was careful to state that it found "as a matter of fact"37 that the
payments were income and not gifts. The court thought that the
facts that distinguished it from Kaiser were (1) the taxpayer was
at all times a union member, (2) the benefit payments were not
paid to or available for nonunion members, (3) the taxpayer was
required to perform strike duties before he was eligible for the
benefit payments, and (4) the union's failure to inquire into the
financial resources of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's need for the
payments was also doubtful."8
After Hagar came the case of Halsor v. Lethert."9 In Halsor
the taxpayer, a pilot, was not on strike but was laid off by North-
western Airlines as a result of a dispute between the International
Association of Machinists and the Air Line Pilots Association.
While he was locked out, the local of the ALPA passed a resolution
whereby "the pilots furloughed due to the dispute arising from
implementation of ALPA Policy"4 would receive benefit payments
from the ALPA. The payments were based on a certain percentage
of the pilot's salary and were not subject to setoff against other
income received by the pilots during the lockout. The court, in
finding as a fact that the payments were not gifts, stressed the
"intention"4 1 of the union, which it found to be the furtherance of
"Ibid. The use of the donor's motive to determine whether a given
transfer is to be treated by the recipient as a gift or income was expressly
rejected in the Duberstein case. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
8843 T.C. 468 (1965).
Id. at 486.88Ibid. The taxpayer's wife while he was on strike received a bi-weekly
take-home pay of $152.93. Taxpayer had a joint tenancy with his wife and
mother in several saving accounts with substantial balances. In addition,
taxpayer had some dividend income during the time of the strike. His wife
was his only dependent.
88240 F. Supp. 738 (D. Minn. 1965).
,oId. at 739.
"Id. at 738.
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the objectives of the association and not a "'detached and disinter-
ested generosity' which is the requisite of a gift under § 102. ' '42
The last case dealing with strike benefit payments is that of
Mabel Phillips.3 The facts in Phillips are almost identical to those
in Hagar, and the tax court relied heavily on Hagar in holding the
benefits taxable. In Phillips, the taxpayer was a journeyman stereo-
typer and a member of a local of the Stereotypers' and Electro-
typers' International Union that struck the newspaper where he was
employed. To receive his benefit payments, taxpayer had to be a
member of the union in good standing and had to "sign-in" daily
at the strike headquarters. The amount of his payments, which
were substantial in comparison with his salary, was not dependent
upon his marital status, number of dependents or financial need,
but was dependent solely upon his classification as a journeyman.
The court concluded that these factors, plus a finding that the union
was morally obligated under its constitution to make the payments
once the taxpayer went on strike, prevented them from being con-
sidered as a gift.
While other areas of the gift vs. income dispute may remain
"unclear and uncertain," it would seem that the decisions in Godwin,
Hagar, Halsor, and Phillips have removed some of the confusion
as to the income tax consequences of union strike benefit payments.
Although the question whether a strike benefit payment in a given
case is a gift or taxable income still remains a factual one, it seems
certain that the benefits received in any case in which the facts are
not very nearly on all fours with Kaiser cannot be classified as a gift.
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-North Carolina's "Good Samaritan" Statute
The 1965 North Carolina General Assembly passed a "Good
Samaritan" statute which provides that:
Any person who renders first aid or emergency assistance at the
scene of a motor vehicle accident on any street or highway to
any person injured as a result of such accident, shall not be
"Id. at 740.
"P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 65, 268 (1965).
[Vol. 44
